+ Publications

1. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2023): “Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism,”

   Mathematics of Operations Research, online (see also working paper version).

2. B. Klaus and C. Meo (2022): “The Core for Housing Markets with Limited Externalities,”

   Economic Theory, 76, 779–811.

3. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2022): "Normative properties for object allocation problems: Characterizations and trade-offs,"

   Online and Matching-Based Market Design, eds. F. Echenique, N. Immorlica, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge University Press, 2022 (see also working paper version).

4. D. Feng and B. Klaus (2022): “Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems,”

   International Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 61-76, Special Issue in Honor of William Thomson (see also working paper version).

5. C. Basteck, B. Klaus, and D. Kuebler (2021):"How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field,"
   Games and Economic Behavior, 129, 198–237 (see also working paper version).

6. B. Klaus and A. Nichifor (2021): "Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices: Heterogeneous Objects,"

   Social Choice and Welfare, 57, 145–162 (see also working paper version).

7. B. Klaus and P. Protopapas (2020):

   "On Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness: Median-Voting over Intervals," 

   International Journal of Game Theory, 49, 1059–1080 (see also working paper version).

8. B. Klaus and P. Protopapas (2020):

   "Solidarity for Public Goods under Single-Peaked Preferences: Characterizing Target Set Correspondences," 

   Social Choice and Welfare, 55, 404-430 (see also working paper version).

9. B. Klaus and A. Nichifor (2020):

   "Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices,”

   Economic Theory, 70, 665-684 (see also working paper version).

10. M. Karakaya, B. Klaus, and J.-C. Schlegel (2019):
    "Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants,"

    Journal of Economic Theory, 184, 104948 (see also working paper version).

11. H. Aziz and B. Klaus (2019):
    "Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts,"
    Social Choice and Welfare, 53, 212-259, 2019 (see also working paper version).

12. B. Dogan and B. Klaus (2018):
    "Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application,"
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 79, 140-156, 2018 (see also working paper version). .

13. K. Cechlarova, B. Klaus, and D. Manlove (2018):
    "Pareto Optimal Matchings of Students to Courses in the Presence of Prerequisites," Discrete Optimization, 29, 174-195, 2018 (see also working paper version).

14. M. Karakaya and B. Klaus (2017):
    "Hedonic Coalition Formation Games with Variable Populations: Core Characterizations and (Im)possibilities,"
    International Journal of Game Theory, 46, 435-455, 2017.

15. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2017):
    "Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability,"
    Games and Economic Behavior, Note, 104, 222-229, 2017.

16. B. Klaus (2017):
    "Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets,"
    Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 43 – 58, 2017.

17. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2016):
    "Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists,"
    Economics Letters, 114, 98 - 101, 2016.

18. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2016):
    "Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance : Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics,"
    Games and Economic Behavior, 97, 128 - 146, 2016.

19. B. Klaus, D.F. Manlove, and F. Rossi (2016):
    "Matching under Preferences." In Handbook of Computational Social Choice (Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia, eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2016.

20. B. Klaus and J. Newton (2016):
    "Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems,"
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 62, 62-74, 2016.

21. B. Klaus and F. Payot (2015):
    "Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem,"
    The Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2, 257-287, 2015.

22. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2014):
    "Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities,"
    Mathematics of Operations Research, 39, 949-966, 2014.

23. B. Can and B. Klaus (2013):
    "Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets,"
    Social Choice and Welfare, 41, 835-862, 2013.

24. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2013):
    "Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement,"
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49, 222-229, 2013.

25. B. Klaus and O. Bochet (2013):
    "The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness,"
    Social Choice and Welfare, 40, 41-63, 2013.

26. I. Ashlagi, E. Karagozoglu, and B. Klaus (2012):
    "A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems,"
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 63, 228-233, 2012.

27. . Klaus, F. Klijn, and M. Walzl (2011):
    "Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets,"
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13, 921-933, 2011.

28. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2011):
    "Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems,""
    International Journal of Game Theory, 40, 281-287, 2011.

29. B. Klaus (2011):
    "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommates Markets,"
    Games and Economic Behavior, 72, 172-186, 2011.

30. B. Klaus, O. Bochet, and M. Walzl (2011):
    "A Dynamic Recontracting Process for Multiple-Type Housing Markets,"
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47, 84-98, 2011.

31. B. Klaus, F. Klijn, and M. Walzl (2010):
    "Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets,"
    Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 2218-2240, 2010.

32. B. Klaus, F. Klijn, and M. Walzl (2010):
    "Farsighted House Allocation,"
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46, 817-824, 2010.

33. C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus (2010):
    "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples,"
    Theory and Decision, 69, 537-554, 2010.

34. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2010):
    "Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians,"
    Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 647-667, 2010.

35. B. Klaus and A. Nichifor (2010):
    "Consistency for One-Sided Assignment Problems,"
    Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 415-433, 2010.

36. B. Klaus (2010):
    "The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked,"
    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Contributions, 10(1), Article 14, 2010.

37. B. Klaus (2010):
    "Matching and the Allocation of Indivisible Objects Via Deferred Acceptance under Responsive Preferences,"
    AENORM, vol. 18 (67) June 2010. This is a non-refereed article for a Dutch Magazine for students in Actuarial Sciences, Econometrics & Operations Research. Here is the pdf file of the article.

38. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2009):
    “Employment by Lotto Revisited,”
    International Game Theory Review, 11, 181-198, 2009.

39. C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus (2009):
    “Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts,”
    Economic Theory, 41, 393-410, 2009.

40. B. Klaus (2009):
    ''Fair Marriages: An Impossibility,”
    Economics Letters, 105, 74-75, 2009. Here is a link to a blogpost on the paper: Economic Logic blogpost.

41. B. Klaus, F. Klijn, T. Nakamura (2009):
    “Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,”
    Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 2227–2233, 2009.

42. B. Klaus and M. Walzl (2009):
    “Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts,”
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 45, 422-434, 2009.

43. B. Klaus (2008):
    “The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second-Best Incentive Compatible,”
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 44, 919-924, 2008.

44. B. Klaus, F. Klijn, and J. Masso (2007):
    “Some Things Couples always wanted to know about Stable Matchings (but were afraid to ask),”
    Review of Economic Design, 11, 175-184, 2007.

45. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2007):
    “Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples,”
    International Journal of Game Theory, 36(2), 177-207, 2007.

46. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2007):
    “Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples,”
    Games and Economic Behavior, 58, 154-171, 2007.

47. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2007):
    “Corrigendum to "On Randomized Matching Mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381],”
    Economic Theory, 32, 411-416, 2007.

48. M. Atlamaz and B. Klaus (2007):
    “Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods,”
    Social Choice and Welfare, 28(1), 1-18, 2007.

49. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2007):
    “Consistent House Allocation,”
    Economic Theory, 30, 561-574, 2007.

50. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2006):
    “Efficient Priority Rules,”
    Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2), 372-384, 2006.

51. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2006):
    “Median Stable Matchings for College Admissions,”
    International Journal of Game Theory, 34(1), 1-11, 2006.

52. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2006):
    “Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching,”
    Economic Theory, 27(2), 431-447, 2006.

53. B. Klaus (2006):
    “A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences,”  
    Social Choice and Welfare, 26(2), 255-261, 2006.

54. B. Klaus, D. Dimitrov, and C.-J. Haake  (2006):
    “Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods,”
    Economics Letters, 93, 106-110, 2006.

55. B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2005):
    “Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,”
    Journal of Economic Theory, 121(1), 75-106, 2005. 
    A corresponding corrigendum is published in the Journal of Economic Theory (2009, 144, 2227-2233) and is downloadable here.

56. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2004):
    “Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems,”
    International Journal of Game Theory, 32(4), 545-560, 2004.
    A corresponding corrigendum is downloadable here.

57. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2003):
    “Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Probabilistic Uniform Rules,”
    Review of Economic Design, 8(3), 249-268, 2003.

58. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2003):
    “Coalitional Strategy-Proofness, Resource-Monotonicity, and Separability for Multiple Assignment Problems,”
    Social Choice and Welfare, 21(2), 265-280, 2003.

59. L. Ehlers, B. Klaus, and S. Pápai (2002):
    “Strategy-Proofness and Population-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems,”
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38(3), 329-339, 2002.

60. B. Klaus and E. Miyagawa (2002):
    “Strategy-Proofness, Solidarity, and Consistency for Multiple Assignment Problems,”
    International Journal of Game Theory, 30(3), 421-435, 2002.

61. B. Klaus and T. Storcken (2002):
    “Choice Correspondences for Public Goods,”
    Social Choice and Welfare, 19(1), 127-154, 2002.

62. R. Supalla, B. Klaus, O. Yeboa, and R. Bruins (2002):
    “A Game Theory Approach to Deciding Who Will Supply Instream Flow Water,”
    Journal of the American Water Resources Association, 38(4), August 2002, 959-966, 2002.

63. L. Ehlers and B. Klaus (2001):
    “Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules,”
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 3(2), 167-184, 2001.

64. B. Klaus (2001):
    “Uniform Allocation and Reallocation Revisited,”
    Review of Economic Design, 6(1), 85-98, 2001.

65. B. Klaus (2001):
    “Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object,”
    Games and Economic Behavior, 34(1), 64-82, 2001.

66. B. Klaus (2001):
    “Population-Monotonicity and Separability for Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object,”
    Economic Theory, 17(3), 675-692, 2001.

67. B. Klaus (2001):
    “Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces,”
    Theory and Decision, 51(1), 13-29, 2001.

68. B. Klaus, H. Peters, and T. Storcken (1998):
    “Strategy-Proof Division with Single-Peaked Preferences and Individual Endowments,”
    Social Choice and Welfare, 15(2), 297-311, 1998.

69. B. Klaus, H. Peters, T. Storcken (1997):
    “Strategy-Proof Division of a Private Good when Preferences are Single-Dipped,”
    Economics Letters, 55(3), 339-346, 1997.

70. B. Klaus, H. Peters, T. Storcken (1997):
    “Reallocation of an Infinitely Divisible Good,”
    Economic Theory, 10(2), 305-333, 1997.